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ABSTRACT
Speculating on bad debt dates back to the 1790’s when investors
purchased claims against the original thirteen colonies. While claims
trading has become more streamlined, complex bankruptcies have
elevated the financial risk of engaging in the process. Nonetheless,
claims trading is undoubtedly a lucrative market, especially for those
who are willing to master the art and take on the risk.
The bankruptcy trustee’s avoiding powers have a tremendous impact
on the claims trading market. In many of these cases the claim would
have been disallowed in the hands in the hands of the original
claimant, pursuant to the Trustee’s power to avoid preferential
transfers and fraudulent conveyances. However, courts have been
unclear whether claims that would have been disallowed in the hands
of the transferor should also be disallowed in the hands of the
subsequent transferee. A claim transferee’s worst nightmare is
investing money in purchasing a claim and then finding the claim to
be disallowed, leaving them with zero payment on their investment.
KB Toys and Enron have created both clarity and confusion for
claim traders.
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INTRODUCTION
The irony of bankruptcy is that within a single bankruptcy
proceeding there exists a multi-billion dollar market—the claims trading

2015]

IS CLAIMS TRADING A RISK OR AN ART?

499

market. 1 At the commencement of a bankruptcy case, creditors find
themselves in a state of limbo, unsure whether their claims will be paid
or even allowed.2 Thus, creditors seek to sell their claims at a discount to
avoid waiting for the bankruptcy process to come to a certain realization
on the value of their claim.3 By selling their claim, they can avoid a
delayed or potentially reduced payment. 4 Claim traders take on these
theoretically risky claims, because “they believe that efficient pricing
will enable them to realize a profit when the claim is paid.”5 However,
this begs the question—what happens if the transferred claim should
have been disallowed in the hands of the original claimants?6 Few courts
have attempted to answer this daunting question but even those that
have, leave unanswered questions about the future of claims trading.7
In a recent case, In re KB Toys, the Third Circuit held trade claims
that would have been disallowed in the hands of the original claimants,
would also be disallowed in the hands of the transferees.8 In contrast, In
re Enron held disabilities are specific to each claimant and do not follow
from the original claimant to the transferee unless the claim was
transferred via assignment.9
While the Court’s ruling in KB Toys applied narrowly to trade
claims 10 and Enron did not indicate how its analysis would treat
different types of claims,11 this could be the first step in changing the
market of claims trading.12 The scope of unanswered questions in the
wake of this evolution includes the fate of bank claims and publically
traded debt. 13 This note will principally discuss the evolution of the
claims trading market for trade claims post-Enron and KB Toys.
1. See Richard K. Milin & Yitzhak Greenberg, More Clarity For Claims Traders:
“Claim Washing” After KB Toys, 1 NORTON BANKR. L. ADVISOR 1 (Thomson Reuters),
January 2014, at 7.
2. See Walter Benzija, Cloudy with a Chance of Disallowance: Does § 502(d)
Inhere to the Claim or Claimant?, 33 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 14, *14 (Feb. 2014).
3. See id.
4. See id.
5. Id.
6. See Milin & Greenberg, supra note 1, at 1.
7. See id. at 7.
8. In re KB Toys Inc., 736 F.3d 247, 249 (3d Cir. 2013).
9. In re Enron Corp. (Enron II), 379 B.R. 425, 448-49 (S.D.N.Y. 2007).
10. KB Toys, 736 F.3d at 249.
11. Enron II, 379 B.R. at 428.
12. See Milin & Greenberg, supra note 1, at 9.
13. Id. at 7.
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Part I of this paper provides a thorough overview of the process of
filing a claim and the claims trading process. Additionally, Part I will
begin to unravel the dilemma posed when claims are transferred
throughout the claims administration process. Part II discusses key
cases, in particular, KB Toys, Enron I and Enron II, which have made
determinations as to whether claims that would be disallowed in the
hands of an original claimant, would also be disallowed in the hands of
subsequent transferees. Finally, Part III discusses the effects of Enron
and KB Toys on the future of the claims trading market and provides a
two-prong approach to mitigating the effects of Enron and KB Toys to
the claims trading market.
I. CLAIMS TRADING: AN OVERVIEW
Part I begins with an overview of how claimants file proof of
claims in a bankruptcy case. Next, this Part examines why claims may
be disallowed and how the disallowance of claims poses a dilemma in
the claims trading process.
A. FILING A PROOF OF CLAIM
When an individual or entity files for bankruptcy protection,
especially in mega Chapter 11 cases14, creditors clamor to “claim” their
right to what is left in the estate or may derived from the liquidation of
assets.15 Pursuant to the debtor’s duties under the Bankruptcy Code, the
debtor is required to file a schedule of assets and liabilities. 16 The
schedule indicates which creditors the debtor believes it owes money

14. Marshall S. Huebner & Elliot Moskowitz, The Prevalence and Utility of
‘Roadmap’ Decisions in Bankruptcy Mega-Cases, FINANCIER WORLDWIDE, available at
http://www.davispolk.com/sites/default/files/huebner.moskow.financier.worldwide.apr1
4.PDF (April 2014) (explaining that Mega Cases are Chapter 11 bankruptcies that
“involve $100 million or more in assets, over 1000 entities and/or a high degree of
public interest”).
15. See generally Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure, Rule 3002 (Rule
3002(c)(5) (referring to the “bar date” which is the date by which creditors must file a
proof of claim; creditors are given at least 90 days notice of the bar date.).
16. 11 U.S.C. § 521(a)(1)(B)(i) (2012); see also Federal Rules of Bankruptcy
Procedure, Rule 1007(a).
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and how much each is owed. 17 Each creditor, whether listed on the
schedule or not, is responsible for verifying the amount they are owed.18
Creditors that are unlisted or believe their claim is incorrect on the
schedule may file a proof of claim, representing the creditor’s right to
payment.19 The Bankruptcy Code defines a claim as a “right to payment,
whether or not such right is reduced to judgment, liquidated,
unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed,
undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or unsecured.”20
As discussed in the Introduction, creditors trade their claims to
other persons or entities willing to take on the uncertainty of payment on
the claim. 21 The claims discussed in this note will primarily refer to
claims filed in Chapter 11 Reorganizations, as Chapter 11 bankruptcies
are major venues for claims trading. 22 Generally, Chapter 11 of the
Bankruptcy Code is utilized by businesses, such as corporations, sole
proprietorships, and partnerships.23
B. THE CLAIMS TRADING DILEMMA
1. The Claims Trading Process
Bankruptcy claims trading means exactly what it sounds like: “the
buying and selling of claims against companies seeking relief under the
Bankruptcy Code.” 24 Pursuant to the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy
Procedure 3001(e), a creditor can sell this “right to payment” 25 to
someone who is willing to enter an auction of illiquid assets.26 Although
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.

Id.
See Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure, Rule 3001(a).
Id.
11 U.S.C. § 101(5)(A) (2012).
Benzija, supra note 2, at *14.
Jeffrey N. Rich & Eric T. Moser, Bankruptcy Claims Trading: Basic Concepts,
PRACTICAL LAW COMPANY, http://www.r3mlaw.com/Articles/Bankruptcy-ClaimsTrading-Basic-Concepts.pdf, 1 (last visited, Apr. 20, 2014).
23. U.S. COURTS, CHAPTER 11: REORGANIZATION UNDER THE BANKRUPTCY CODE,
available
at
http://www.uscourts.gov/FederalCourts/Bankruptcy/BankruptcyBasics/Chapter11.aspx.
24. Rich & Moser, supra note 22, at 1.
25. Id.
26. Edward S Weisfelner, How Distressed Claims Trading May Impact Your
Reorganization Strategy, in NAVIGATING TODAY’S ENVIRONMENT: THE DIRECTORS’
AND OFFICERS’ GUIDE TO RESTRUCTURING 1, 2 (Globe White Page ed., 2010)
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various types of bankruptcy claims are traded on the market, this note
will focus on trade claims.27 Trade claims are unsecured obligations of
the debtor, generally held by the debtor’s vendors, suppliers, service
providers, landlords, lawyers, unions and employees.28 Trade claims fall
into three categories: general unsecured claims, priority claims, and
unsecured claims with de facto priority.29 General unsecured claims are
always the last to be paid; therefore, there is no guarantee they will be
paid in full.30 On the other hand, priority claims must be paid in full,
unless, the creditor waives full payment.31
One of the biggest incentives for claim-holders to sell their claim is
the financial relief correlated with discontinuing participation in the
bankruptcy.32 If a creditor sells his claim, he no longer has to deal with
the nuisance of following the bankruptcy or concerning himself with
fighting for payment on his claim.33 The transferor can reduce his legal
expenses for evaluating its claim and participating in the timeconsuming34 bankruptcy process.35 Thus, the key reason transferors sell
claims is to receive a quicker or more certain realization on their claim.36
Additionally, in the likely occurrence the claim is sold for a loss,
the buyer can obtain a tax deduction. 37 Claims are generally sold for
much less than the value of the claim because of the risks associated

(explaining that SecondMarket is a platform for “illiquid assets” such as bankruptcy
claims).
27. Rich & Moser, supra note 22, at 1 (noting other types of claims traded on the
market include secured claims and counterparty claims).
28. See id.
29. See id.
30. See id.
31. See id.
32. Rich & Moser, supra note 22, at 2.
33. Benzija, supra note 2, at *14.
34. Maureen Farrell, Lehman Bankruptcy Bill: $1.6 billion, CNN (March 6, 2012,
4:06 pm). By March 2012, the fees for lawyers and consultants in the Lehman Brother’s
bankruptcy were nearly $1.6 billion. The bankruptcy consulting firm, Alvarez &
Marsal, has collected more than $512 million in fees since January 2012. The Debtor’s
law firm, Weil, Gotshal & Manges LLP is set to collect nearly $383 million and the
firm representing the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors has already billed
$133 million.
35. See Rich & Moser, supra note 22, at 1.
36. Benzija, supra note 2, at *14.
37. Rich & Moser, supra note 22, at 2.
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with claims trading. 38 However, the tax savings the business receives
can marginally recoup this loss.39
On the flipside, transferees acquire these claims in hope to collect a
profit when the claim is paid.40 At first look, it seems reckless to buy a
right to payment when payment isn’t guaranteed.41 However, aside from
desire for profit, buyers often participate in the claims trading market in
order to obtain a “controlling block” of claims within a particular claim
category, allowing them to play a tremendous role in shaping the
reorganization plan.42 This allows a transferee to gain leverage in the
bankruptcy case and obtain equity in the reorganized company.43
While the claims trading market seems like a nightmare to those
who are risk-averse, it can be an extremely lucrative market. 44 The
benefit of claims trading flows through the entire financial system. 45
Claims trading provides liquidity in an otherwise illiquid market. 46
Because claims trading gives banks, insurance companies, trade
creditors and other financial institutions an exit option, “lending
institutions are apt to provide increased capital to borrowers.”47 In 2009,
the claims trading market was approximately $500 billon. 48 Although
the number of bankruptcies has decreased tremendously since the 2008
economic crisis, in 2012 the claims trading market was still valued at
approximately $41 billion.49
2. The Claims Trading Hypothetical
Hypothetically, if Creditor A had received a preferential payment
less than ninety days before Company X filed for bankruptcy, the
Trustee would likely use its avoiding powers to recover the preferential

38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

Benzija, supra note 2, at *14.
See Rich & Moser, supra note 22, at 6.
Benzija, supra note 2, at *14.
See discussion infra Part I.B.3.
See Weisfelner, supra note 26, at 3.
See Rich & Moser, supra note 22, at 2.
See Benzija, supra note 2, at *14.
See Weisfelner, supra note 26, at 1.
Id. at 3.
Id.
Id. at 2.
See Rich & Moser, supra note 22, at 1.
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payment Creditor A received. 50 Until the preferential payment is
returned to the estate, Creditor A may not receive payment on any of its
allowed claims.51 Complications arise when Creditor A sells its claims
to Creditor B, but does not return its preferential payment to the
bankruptcy estate. The lack of clarity under the Bankruptcy Code,
especially under Section 502(d), has led to cloudy approaches to
determining whether Creditor B’s claim should be allowed.52
3. Disallowance of Claims
After a proof of claim has been filed, pursuant to Section 502 of the
Bankruptcy Code, claims may be allowed or disallowed.53 While a claim
may be allowed under Section 502 of the Bankruptcy Code, it is not
necessarily paid in the distribution of the estate. 54 In particular,
unsecured claims are distributed by way of the level of priority under
Section 507 of the Bankruptcy Code.55 Domestic support obligations are
among the first to be paid, followed by administrative expenses.56 Thus,
as the level of priority of a claim decreases, the risk of non-repayment
on the claim increases.57

50. See 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(4)(A) (2012) (“[T]he trustee may avoid any transfer of
an interest of the debtor in property . . . made on or within 90 days before the date of the
filing of the petition . . . .”).
51. See 11 U.S.C. § 502(d) (2012) (“[T]he court shall disallow any claim of any
entity from which property is recoverable under section . . . 547 . . . of this title, unless
such entity or transferee has paid the amount, or turned over any such property, for
which such entity or transferee is liable . . . .”).
52. See id.; Benzija, supra note 2, at *14 (noting ambiguity in language of Section
502(d)).
53. 11 U.S.C. § 502 (2012).
54. 11 U.S.C. § 507 (2012). “The claims standing on the highest rung must be paid
in full before any claims on the next rung can be paid anything.” See John D. Ayer,
Michael L. Bernstein & Jonathan Friedland, Chapter 11—”101”, The Am. Bankr. Inst.
J. (Feb. 24, 2004), available at http://www.kirkland.com/siteFiles/kirkexp/publications/
2392/Document1/Friedland_Priorities.pdf (last visited Oct. 22, 2014).
55. 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(3) (unsecured claims have third level of priority).
56. Id. § 507(a)(1)–(2).
57. See Ayer, Bernstein & Friedland, supra note 54 (“[I]n many cases the priority
claims will eat up the assets before we ever get to the residual non-priority class.”).
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Among the many reasons a claim may be disallowed, including an
untimely filing of the claim58 and unenforceability of the claim against
the debtor,59 this note will focus on disallowance of claims pursuant to
the Trustee’s power to avoid certain transfers outside the estate.60 The
wrinkle in claims trading arises from these avoiding powers.61
Section 547(b)(4)(A) of the Bankruptcy Code gives the Trustee
power to avoid preferential payments made to creditors ninety days
before the commencement of the case62 or unauthorized and fraudulent
transfers of property of the estate two years prior to the filing of the
bankruptcy petition.63 Pursuant to § 502(d), “the court shall disallow any
claim from any entity from which property is recoverable” or that is a
transferee of an avoidable transfer, unless the transferee has paid the
avoidable amount, or turned over that property.64
Section 502(d) creates a mechanism to deal with creditors who have
possession of estate property on the bankruptcy petition date or are
the recipients of pre- or post-bankruptcy asset transfers that can be
avoided because they are fraudulent, preferential, unauthorized, or
otherwise subject to forfeiture by operation of a bankruptcy trustee’s
65
avoidance powers.

58. 11 U.S.C. § 502(b)(9) (2012) (“[T]he court, after notice and a hearing, shall
determine the amount of such claim in lawful currency of the United States as of the
date of the filing of the petition, and shall allow such claim in such amount, except to
the extent that . . . proof of such claim is not timely filed . . . .”).
59. See id. § 502(b)(1).
60. See id. § 502(c).
61. See id. § 502(d) (2005); see also 11 U.S.C. § 550 (2012). “[T]he cloud on the
claim continues until the preference payment is returned, regardless of whether the
person or entity holding the claim received the preference payment.” In re KB Toys
Inc., 736 F.3d 247, 254 (3d Cir. 2013).
62. 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(4)(A) (2012) (“[T]he trustee may avoid any transfer of an
interest of the debtor in property . . . made on or within 90 days before the date of the
filing of the petition . . . .”).
63. Id. § 548(a)(1)(A) (2012) (“The trustee may avoid any transfer . . . if the debtor
voluntarily or involuntarily made such transfer or incurred such obligation with actual
intent to hinder, delay, or defraud any entity to which the debtor was or became, on or
after the date that such transfer was made or such obligation was incurred,
indebted . . . .”).
64. Id. § 502(d).
65. Charles M. Oellerman & Mark G. Douglas, KB Toys: Hobgoblins Return to
Haunt Bankruptcy Claims Traders, JONES DAY PUBLICATIONS 1 (July/August 2012),
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The motive of this section is to promote equality amongst creditors,
so that entities cannot share in the distribution of the estate’s assets until
they have returned recoverable property and avoidable transfers. 66
However, it is unclear whether a subsequent transferee of a claim can
collect on its claim, if the original transferor has not returned that
preferential payment.
a. Legislative History of Section 502(d)
Section 502(d) of the Bankruptcy Code is derived from Section
57(g) of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898.67 Section 57(g) states “the claims
of creditors who have received or acquired preferences, liens,
conveyances, transfers, assignments or encumbrances, void or voidable
under this title, shall not be allowed unless such creditors shall surrender
such preferences, liens, conveyances, transfers, assignments, or
encumbrances.” 68 In order to determine whether the focus of Section
502(d) was the claim or claimants, courts looked to how past courts
interpreted the phrase “claims of creditors” in Section 57(g). 69 If the
focus of “claims of any creditor” was the claim, Section 57(g) would
have permitted transferred claims to be disallowed. 70 Alternatively, if
the focus of the section was the claimants, disabilities would remain
with the claimant and would not travel with the claim. Thus, a claim
would only be disallowable in the hands of the original claimant.71
While courts may look to legislative history of Section 502(d), it is
still unclear if the focus of Section 502(d) is the claim or claimant. This
available at http://www.jonesday.com/kb-toys-hobgoblins-return-to-haunt-bankruptcyclaims-traders.
66. 11 U.S.C. § 502(d) (2012); Andrea Saavedra, Section 502(d) of the Bankruptcy
Code Permits Disallowance of Claims Transferred to Third Parties Where the
Underlying Avoidance Action Remains Unresolved, WEIL, GOTSHAL & MANGES LLP
BANKRUPTCY BULLETIN (June 2006).
67. In re KB Toys Inc., 736 F.3d 247, 254 n.9 (3d Cir. 2013) (“Other courts have
recognized that section 57(g) is relevant to the interpretation of § 502(d).”); see In re
LaRoche Indus., Inc., 284 B.R. 406, 409 (Bankr. D. Del. 2002) (examining a case
interpreting section 57(g) when faced with an issue arising under § 502(d)).
68. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, §§ 212, 249 (codified at 11 U.S.C. §§ 612, 649
(1976)) (repealed Oct. 1, 1979).
69. Milin & Greenberg, supra note 1, at 7.
70. See In re Enron Corp. (Enron II), 379 B.R. 425, 439 (S.D.N.Y. 2007).
71. Id.
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leaves open the question of what happens to trade claims in the hands of
a subsequent or immediate transferee, when the trade claim would have
been disallowed in the hands of the original claimant because of an
avoidable preference or fraudulent conveyance: enter—In re KB Toys,72
Enron I73 and Enron II.74
b. Disallowance Under § 550
Section 550 of the Bankruptcy Code is dedicated to the Trustee’s
avoiding powers against immediate and mediate transferees of the
property of the estate. 75 In the context of claims trading, the original
claimants would be the initial transferee, and all subsequent transferees
would be immediate and mediate transferees. 76 In the hypothetical
discussed in Part I.C.(a), Creditor B would be the immediate
transferee.77
Immediate and mediate transferees have an affirmative good faith
defense if they took the transferred property for value, in good faith and
without knowledge of the violability of the transfer.78 Unfortunately for
claims traders, the courts have unilaterally held that Section 550
provides a good faith defense to the transfer of property but not the
transfer of a claim.79 Thus, the good faith defense of Section 550 is not
applicable in the claims trading context.80

72.
73.

Id. at 249.
In re Enron Corp. (Enron I), 340 B.R. 180 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2006), vacated
and remanded, 379 B.R. 425 (S.D.N.Y. 2007).
74. Enron II, 379 B.R. at 425.
75. 11 U.S.C. § 550 (2012).
76. See id.
77. See id.
78. Id. § 550(b)(1).
79. Enron I, 340 B.R. at 206 (“[A] claim as defined under [§] 101(5), is not, and
has never been, considered property of the estate (it is being asserted against) under [§]
541 of the Bankruptcy Code.”).
80. In re KB Toys Inc., 736 F.3d 247, 255 (3d Cir. 2013) (holding that Section 550
is not applicable to claims trading because the subsequent transferee did not purchase
property of the estate).
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II. CLAIMS TRADING CASE LAW
Part II provides a deep recitation of the facts and court’s analysis in
KB Toys, Enron I and Enron II. This section also provides an overview
of older cases that view Section 502(d) with a different lens.
A. KEY CLAIMS TRADING CASE LAW
1. In re KB Toys
a. The Facts
Between April 7, 2004 and May 22, 2007, ASM Capital L.P and
ASM Capital II LLP (“KB Transferees”), purchased nine claims (“KB
Claims”) executed by Assignment Agreements from various trade
creditors (“KB Original Claimants”).81 In line with standard practice of
claims trading, four of the claims contained generic indemnification
clauses.82 These indemnification clauses contained “provisions designed
to protect [claim traders] from defects that [were] not readily known or
knowable at the time of transfer.”83 In this case, the specific provisions
shifted the risk of disallowance back to the KB Original Claimants by
requiring them to pay restitution to KB Transferees if the KB Claim was
deemed disallowed.84
Prior to the KB Claim Transferee’s purchase of the claims, each
KB Original Claimant was listed on the Statement of Financial Affairs
(“SOFA”) as receiving a payment within ninety days of the petition
date. 85 Because each KB Original Claimant had received preference
payments, the trustee brought and obtained judgment on each preference
action.86 All but one of the claims was purchased prior to the Trustee’s

81.
82.
83.
84.
85.

Id. at 250.
Id.
Benzija, supra note 2, at *14 (citing KB Toys, 736 F.3d at 250).
In re KB Toys, 736 F.3d at 250.
Id. (“Each SOFA required the disclosure of all payments made within the 90
days immediately preceding the Petition Date.”).
86. Id.
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judgment on the preference actions.87 Unfortunately for the Trustee, the
judgments in each preference action were not collectable because the
KB Original Claimants went out of business.88 Thus, the Trustee sought
to disallow the claims transferred to the KB Transferees.89
b. The Court’s Analysis
“The Trustee contended that the [KB] Claims [were] disallowable
under § 502(d) because each [KB] Original Claimant received a
preference before transferring its Claim to [the KB Claim
Transferees].” 90 The court outlined the process and factors it would
consider to make its determination.91 First, the court turned to the text of
the statute, noting that a textual analysis would call for the court to apply
the text of the statute if the text is clear and unambiguous. 92 If the
statutory text was ambiguous, the court’s next step would be to look at
the legislative history of the statute. 93 While undertaking a statutory
interpretation of § 502(d), the court would also look at the Bankruptcy
Code holistically and consider all of the provisions of the Code.94 Lastly,
and arguably more importantly, the court looked to the object and policy
of the statute.95
While sidestepping the question of whether the statute is clear and
unambiguous, the Third Circuit began by finding the language of §
502(d) rendered a whole category of claims disallowable—claims that
had received avoidable transfers.96 Therefore, “‘any claim’ falling into
87. Id. (noting KB Transferee’s purchased eight of the claims before the Trustee
commenced preference actions and one was obtained after the Trustee obtained a
judgment).
88. Id.
89. Id. (noting the Trustee did not seek to avoid the transfer, but rather to assert the
claims were disallowed because the KB Original Claimants had received a preference).
90. Id.
91. See id. at 251-54.
92. Id. at 251; see Roth v. Norfalco LLC, 651 F.3d 367, 379 (3d Cir. 2011)
(holding if the text of the statute is plain, the Court’s inquiry ends).
93. In re KB Toys, 736 F.3d at 251; see Official Comm. Of Unsecured Creditors of
Cybergenics Corp. ex rel. Cybergenics Corp. v. Chinery, 330 F.3d 548, 559 (3d Cir
2003) (“[Courts] must not be guided by a single sentence or member of a sentence, but
look to the provisions of the whole law, and to its object and policy.”).
94. In re KB Toys, 736 F.3d at 251; see Cybergenics, 330 F.3d at 559.
95. Cybergenics, 330 F.3d at 559.
96. In re KB Toys, 736 F.3d at 252.
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this category of claims is disallowable until the avoidable transfer is
returned.” 97 “Because the statute focuses on claims—and not
claimants—claims that are disallowable under § 502(d) must be
disallowed no matter who holds them.”98 Thus, the claim’s disallowance
traveled with the claim and was not washed of its disallowance. 99
Notably, the court refused to cite a distinction in the rule for claims that
were sold, rather than assigned.100
In looking to the legislative history of § 502(d) the Third Circuit
looked to its past equivalent, § 57(g) of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898.101
The court looked to Swarts v. Siegal to determine whether § 502(d) is
consistent with past court’s interpretation of § 57(g).102 In Swarts, the
court held that the “[t]he disqualification of a claim for allowance
created by a preference inheres in and follows every part of the claim,
whether retained by the original creditor or transferred to another, until
the preference is surrendered.”103 Thus, the Third Circuit concluded the
legislative history of § 502(d), namely § 57(g), was consistent with the
Third Circuit’s interpretation of the law.104
Additionally, in looking to the law’s “object and policy,” 105 the
Court in KB Toys cited policy objectives for its interpretation of the
statute.106 If the court allowed original claimants to “wash” their claim
of any disability by selling it, the original claimant would still receive
value for a claim that would have otherwise been disallowed.107 If these
97.
98.
99.
100.

See id. at 251-52.
Id. at 252.
Id. at 252-53.
Id. at 254 n.11 (“Enron II’s reliance on this supposed state law distinction may
also be problematic for several reasons. First, the state law on which it relies does not
provide a distinction between assignments and sales. Second, resort to state law in a
bankruptcy case must be done with care.”).
101. Id. at 254. “The legislative history provides that § 502(d) is derived from
present law, which, as the Bankruptcy Court noted, was section 57(g) of the Bankruptcy
Act of 1898.” Id. at 253 (internal citation omitted).
102. In re KB Toys, 736 F.3d at 253.
103. Id. (quoting Swarts v. Seigel, 117 F. 13, 15 (8th Cir. 1902)).
104. Id. (“[T]he case law interpreting section 57(g) is consistent with our
interpretation of § 502(d).”).
105. Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of Cybergenics Corp. ex rel.
Cybergenics Corp. v. Chinery, 330 F.3d 548, 559 (3d Cir 2003).
106. In re KB Toys, 736 F.3d at 252.
107. Id.
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transferees were permitted to recover on their claim, the guaranteed
consequence was less money for the estate to distribute to other
creditors.108 If every claim could be washed of disability, every claimant
with a claim subject to disallowance would transfer his or her claim,109
undermining one of the aims of § 502(d).110 A large purpose of § 502(d)
is to assist the Trustee in creditor compliance with judicial orders.111
Once a judgment is issued with respect to a claim, § 502(d) compels
claimants to return preferential payments as a condition of receiving
payment on their claim. 112 However, if the claim is washed of any
disability after it’s transferred, the Trustee’s power to disallow
problematic claims is rendered useless.113
2. Enron I and II
a. The Facts
Prior to filing for bankruptcy protection, Enron entered into shortterm credit agreements with several banks.114 At various points after the
Enron bankruptcy filing, Citibank and other syndicate banks, transferred
claims to parties such as Deutsche Bank via a Purchase and Sale
Agreement and an Assignment and Acceptance.115 Additionally, claims
were transferred to Avenue Special Situations Fund II, LP (“Avenue”),
DK Acquisition Partners, LP (“DK”), RCG Carpathia Master Fund Ltd.
(“RCG”), Rushmore Capital–I, LLC (“Rushmore I”) and Rushmore
Capital–II, LLC (“Rushmore II”) (collectively, the “Enron
Transferees”). 116 Specifically, on February 22, 2002, a claims transfer
(“Enron Claims”) was made from Citibank to Deutsche Bank. 117 On
108.
109.
110.

Id.
Id.
Id. “The twin aims of the section 502(d) are ‘to assure an equality of
distribution of the assets of the bankruptcy estate’ and ‘to have the coercive effect of
insuring compliance with judicial orders.” In re Enron Corp. (Enron II), 379 B.R. 425,
435 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (citing In re Davis, 889 F.2d 658, 661-62 (5th Cir. 1989).
111. Enron II, 379 B.R. at 435 (S.D.N.Y. 2007).
112. 11 U.S.C. § 502(d) (2012).
113. In re KB Toys, 736 F.3d at 252.
114. Enron II, 379 B.R. at 428.
115. Enron II, 379 B.R. at 428-29.
116. In re Enron Corp. (Enron I), 340 B.R. 180, 185 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2006),
vacated and remanded, 379 B.R. 425 (S.D.N.Y. 2007).
117. Enron II, 379 B.R. at 429.
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May 15, 2002, Deutsche Bank transferred its Enron claims to
Springfield through a Purchase and Sale Agreement.118 Most of these
transfers included general indemnity clauses protecting the transferor in
an event the claim receives less favorable treatment.119
On September 24, 2003, Enron filed an action in the Bankruptcy
Court for “disallowance of the transferors’ claims under section 502(d)
of the Bankruptcy Code based on allegations that the transferors
received and failed to repay certain avoidable transfers[,]” along with
several other claims for equitable subordination and compensatory and
punitive damages.120
b. Enron I
The Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York found
that a claim disallowable in the hands of an original claimant could be
equally disallowable in the hands of a subsequent transferee. 121 The
Bankruptcy Court noted the lack of case law on this issue but “where an
entity, subject to an avoidance action, holds a claim—a right to payment
or remedy—against the debtor and transfers such claim, the section
502(d) disallowance applies to the transferred claim unless and until the
amount owed to the estate as a result of the avoidance action is received
by the bankrupt estate.122 Thus, the “identity of the holder of a claim is
irrelevant when the estate takes action against such claim under section
502(d) because ‘[t]he claim and the defense to the claim under section
502(d) cannot be altered by the claimant’s subsequent assignment of the
claim to another entity . . . that has not received an avoidable
transfer.’”123

118.
119.
120.
121.
122.

Id.
Id. at 428.
Id. at 429.
Enron I, 340 B.R. at 183.
Id. at 194-95 (“The Court has not found any case law mandating that the
creditor who received an avoidable transfer be the same entity that actually asserts such
claim against the debtor in the bankruptcy proceeding in order for a debtor to assert a
section 502(d) disallowance against such claim.”).
123. Id. at 195 (quoting In re Metiom, Inc., 301 B.R. 634, 642-43 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
2003)).
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The Bankruptcy Court also factored policy considerations for its
finding that claims could not simply be washed of their disabilities.124
The Court sought to prevent creditors from transferring their claims to
wash them of disability.125 Allowing claim washing would eviscerate the
meaning of § 502(d) because entities that received voidable transfers
could share in the distribution, even indirectly, without returning
preferences and fraudulent conveyances.126
c. Enron II
In Enron II127, the District Court overturned the Bankruptcy Court’s
ruling in Enron I. The District Court began its analysis by looking at the
plain language of § 502(d). 128 The Court highlighted that § 502(d)
requires disallowance of “any claim of any entity from which property is
recoverable . . . or that is a transferee of a transfer avoidable . . . unless
such entity or transferee has paid that amount, or turned over any such
property, for which such entity or transferee is liable.” 129 The court
deduced that the plain language focused on the claimant, referenced as
the entity or transferee in the statute, and not on the claim itself.130 Thus,
disallowance is a “personal disability” that attaches to the claimant and
not an attribute of the claim itself.131
The Court supported its analysis by citing the opportunistic purpose
of § 502(d).132 Section 502(d) gives creditors a chance to collect on their
claim, even if they received a preference or fraudulent conveyance.133
However, this opportunity is only available if the claimant surrenders
any fraudulent or preferential transfers.134 The Court insinuated that this
124.
125.

Enron I, 340 B.R. at 199-205.
Id. at 199-202 (“One of the consequences would be to encourage the creditors
to ‘wash’ the claims free of any possibility of disallowance by simply transferring
them.”).
126. Id. at 201.
127. In re Enron Corp. (Enron II), 379 B.R. 425 (S.D.N.Y. 2007).
128. Enron II, 379 B.R. at 431-32.
129. Id. at 443 (citing 11 U.S.C. § 502(d) (2012)) (emphasis added).
130. Enron II, 379 B.R. at 443 (“The plain language of section 502(d) focuses on
the claimant as opposed to the claim and leads to the inexorable conclusion that
disallowance is a personal disability of a claimant, not an attribute of the claim.”).
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. 11 U.S.C. § 502(d) (2012).
134. Enron II, 379 B.R. at 443.
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purpose of § 502(d) would not be served if the attribute of disallowance
attached to the claim because the subsequent transferee never received
the preference to begin with.135 Thus, the statute would be punitive and
would require transferee’s to surrender something they do not have,
namely the avoidable assets.136
The court extended its analysis by distinguishing between the
assignment and sale of claims and the legal consequences of each type
of transfer. 137 An assignment is “a contractual transfer of a right,
interest, or claim from one person to another.”138 An assignee “stands in
the shoes of the assignor”139 and assumes any attached limitations if the
claim was in the hands of the assignor. 140 Theoretically, an assignee
cannot get more than an assignor has because in an assignment the
assignor and assignee swap places.141 On the other hand, when a claim is
sold, a purchaser does not necessarily take on all of the rights of the
seller. 142 Further, a purchaser cannot stand in the shoes of a seller
because theoretically the purchaser can obtain more than the transferor
had.143
Moreover, the court analyzed whether transferred claims derived
the “personal disabilities” of the original claimant. 144 The court
determined that disallowance is a personal attribute that belonged to the
claimant and not the claim itself.145 Thus, sales of claims do not transfer
135. See id. at 435, 445 (“This is a question of allocating the burden and risk of
pursuing the bad actor transferor between two groups of innocents: the creditors as a
whole or the transferee.”).
136. Id. at 443.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Goldie v. Cox, 130 F.2d 695, 720 (8th Cir. 1942).
140. Caribbean S.S. Co., S.A. v. Sonmez Denizcilik Ve Ticaret A.S., 598 F.2d 1264,
1266–67 (2d Cir. 1979).
141. See Fleet Capital Corp. v. Yamaha Motor Corp., U.S.A., No. 01 Civ. 1047,
(AJP), 2002 WL 31174470, at *32 n.39 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 26, 2002) (citing BLACK’S
LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed. 1990)).
142. Enron II, 379 B.R. at 435-36.
143. Id. at 435.
144. Id. at 443.
145. Id. (“Where a claimant has purchased its claim, as opposed to receiving it by
assignment, operation of law, or subrogation, assignment law principles have no
application with respect to personal disabilities of claimants. Thus, purchasers are
protected from being subject to the personal disabilities of their sellers.”).
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the personal attributes of the claimant to the buyer.146 However, when
the original claimant transfers the claim via assignment, the transferor
steps into the shoes of the original claimant and assumes his personal
disabilities.147
3. Effect of Enron II: In re Longacre
Indemnification clauses play a crucial role in the claims trading
process.148 This is clearly evident in the litigation that took place within
the Delphi Automotive Systems bankruptcy, Longacre Master Fund Ltd.
v. ATS Automation Tooling Systems Inc. 149 In Longacre, the original
claimant, ATS Automation Tooling Systems Inc., sold its $2.14 million
claim to Longacre for eighty-nine cents on the dollar. 150 Although
unsecured claims occasionally don’t get paid at all, the high purchase
price was justified because the claim was expected to be paid in full.151
The indemnification provision in the transfer agreement provided
the transferor would repay the transferee “an amount equal to the
portion of the Minimum Claim Amount subject to the Impairment
multiplied by the Purchase Rate . . . , plus interest thereon at 10% per
annum from the date hereof to the date of repayment” if the claim was
“offset, objected to, disallowed, subordinated, in whole or in part.”152
Essentially, the provision would kick in if the claim was impaired and
the issue was not resolved within 180 days.153
Within ninety days of the bankruptcy filing, Delphi filed a claims
objection in order to reserve its right to disallow the claim. 154 As it
146.
147.
148.

Id. at 442.
Id.
See Rich & Moser, supra note 22, at 4 (“A seller should be wary of selling its
claims if it knows that it has exposure for an avoidance action, such as a preference,
because that exposure is likely to trigger a future indemnification claim by the buyer
and may defeat the purpose of selling the claim.”).
149. Longacre Master Fund, Ltd. v. ATS Automation Tooling Sys. Inc. (Longacre
II), 496 F. App’x 135, 138 (2d Cir. 2012).
150. Longacre Master Fund, Ltd. v. ATS Automation Tooling Sys. Inc. (Longacre
I), 456 B.R. 633, 637, 636 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) vacated in part, 496 F. App’x 135 (2d Cir.
2012).
151. Id. at 636 (noting the First Plan provided for full payment on all unsecured
claims).
152. Longacre I, 456 B.R. at 637.
153. See id.
154. Id.
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turned out, ATS had made a $17.3 million payment to Delphi within the
ninety days prior to the bankruptcy filing.155 Therefore, prior to selling
its claim, ATS knew its claim could have been disallowed because of its
preference payment.156
When the indemnification provision kicked in, the interest at ten
percent per annum alone equaled $762,811.35.157 If the provision was
enforced, the transferee would have to pay the transferor approximately
$2.67 million, about $500,000 more than the original filed claim
amount.158 Although Delphi eventually withdrew its objection, the buyer
of the claim requested $817,037.17, calculated as the interest accruing at
ten percent per annum on the purchase price from the date of the claimpurchase agreement to the withdrawal of the claims objection and
dismissal of the adversary proceeding.159
The District Court considered whether the claim objection
constituted an impairment of the claim or was simply a reservation of
rights.160 If the claim objection impaired the claim, the indemnification
clause in the transfer agreement would kick in. 161 The District Court
looked to Enron to determine whether the transfer constituted a sale or
assignment, as the distinction was crucial to interpreting the transfer
agreement. 162 The District Court found that because the transfer
agreement limited the transferee’s rights to those “necessary to support
or enforce the [c]laim[,]” 163 and left defense rights with the seller, it
must be a sale.164 The Court noted, “a creditor retains preference liability
if it sells its bankruptcy claim, but passes such liability if it assigns the
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.

Id. at 637.
See id.
Id. at 639.
Id.
Id. at 639.
Id. at 640 (“The Adversary Proceeding having been dismissed, no vehicle
exists through which such an objection could be raised, filed, or formally commenced
in the future.”).
161. See id. (Under the Transfer Agreement a claim “objected to” or made subject to
offset” would be considered impaired. However, “[n]o section 502(d) objection ha[d]
been actually raised, filed, or formally commenced against the Claim.”).
162. Id. at 640.
163. Id.
164. One Step Forward, Two Steps Back: An Update on Case Law Interpreting
Transferee Liability in the Trading Market, LATHAM & WATKINS BUY-SIDE BRIEFS
(Oct. 19, 2012) [hereinafter BUY SIDE BRIEFS].
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claim.”165 “A ‘pure assignment’ would leave no retained rights with the
seller”166 because an assignment would put the transferee in the shoes of
the transferor.167 Thus, no impairment on the claim was possible because
there was no assignment and under Enron II the claim was washed of §
502(d) disallowance.168 Additionally, the court found the objection was a
reservation of rights, rather than a true objection to the claim.169
The Second Circuit reviewed the District Court’s ruling de novo
and determined the claim was impaired by the claims objection. 170
“Thus, even if the objection was in effect only a reservation of rights
rather than an objection they intended to pursue immediately, it still
constituted an objection under the purchase agreement.” 171 The court
noted that once the claim was objected to, it could not be deemed
allowed. 172 Thus, if the claim was no longer deemed allowed, it was
clearly impaired.173
Additionally, the Second Circuit indirectly called into question
Enron’s sale/assignment dichotomy but left the law unchanged.174 The
Second Circuit rejected the District Court’s conclusion that the claim
transfer was a sale, rather than an assignment.175 The court held that the
transfer agreement “strongly suggest[ed] that it was an assignment”
because it was “(i) titled an ‘Assignment of Claim’; (ii) included
language stating the agreement ‘unconditionally sells, transfers, and

165. J.R. Smith & Justin F. Paget, Selling A Bankruptcy Claim Understanding
Repurchase Provisions, 32 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 32, 32 (2013) (citing In re Enron Corp.
(Enron II), 379 B.R. 425 (S.D.N.Y. 2007)).
166. BUY-SIDE BRIEFS, supra note 164.
167. In re Enron Corp. (Enron II), 379 B.R. 425, 442-43 (S.D.N.Y. 2007).
168. See id. at 443-44.
169. Longacre I, 456 B.R. at 637.
170. Longacre Master Fund, Ltd. v. ATS Automation Tooling Sys. Inc. (Longacre
II), 496 F. App’x 135, 138 (2d Cir. 2012).
171. Id.
172. Longacre II, 496 F. App’x at 138 (“[E]ven if the objection was in effect only a
reservation of rights rather than an objection they intended to pursue immediately, it
still constituted an objection under the purchase agreement.”).
173. See id. (The Court found that Delphi’s objection clearly fell into the purchase
agreement’s definition of impairment, which occurred when “all or any part of the
Claim is . . . objected to . . . in whole or in part . . . .”).
174. Id. at 139 (noting the transfer contract included both the terms assignment and
sale).
175. Id.
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assigns’; and (iii) the agreement says the parties recognize ‘this
assignment of claim as [an] unconditional assignment[.]’”176
B. OTHER RELEVANT CLAIMS TRADING CASES
Below is a brief explanation of the facts and determinations of
cases that guided the courts in KB Toys, Enron I and Enron II.
1. In re Wood & Locker
The facts of In re Wood & Locker, Inc.177 are similar to those of
Enron and KB Toys. Original claimants, William-Patterson (“Wood &
Locker Original Claimants”) transferred its claims to InterFirst Bank
Dallas (“Wood & Locker Transferees”).178 However, the debtor, Wood
& Locker, initiated a preference action against the Wood & Locker
Original Claimants, halting the Wood & Locker Transferee’s
entitlement to any distributions. 179 The court asserted if there was no
liability under the enumerated sections of § 502(d), it would not be
triggered. 180 The avoidance action was triggered to recover property
from Wood & Locker Original Claimants and not the Wood & Locker
Transferees. 181 Hence, the Wood & Locker Transferees were third
parties that were not the “kind of creditor” the trustee could recover
property from. 182 Therefore, because the original claimant was liable
under § 502(d) and not the transferee, the court found the disallowance
provision was not triggered.183

176.
177.

1988).
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.

BUY-SIDE BRIEFS, supra note 164 (citing Longacre II, 496 F. App’x at 139).
In re Wood & Locker, Inc., 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19501 (W.D. Tex. June 17,
Id. at *2.
Id.
Id. at *7-8.
Id. at *4-5
Id. at *8-9.
Id.
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2. In re Metiom
In In re Metiom, 184 both the original claimant and subsequent
transferee filed for bankruptcy protection. 185 The court found the
transferee was subject to all of the equities and burdens that attached to
the property.186 Further, the disallowance of a claim created from one
creditor followed to subsequent transferors until the preference is
returned back to the estate.187
III. EFFECTS AND EVOLUTION OF THE CLAIMS TRADING MARKET
Part III begins with a synthesis of the court’s holding in KB Toys
and Enron II. Next, this section discusses the effect of the holdings in
KB Toys and Enron II on the claims trading market. Lastly, this section
provides a two-prong solution to the claims trading dilemma.
A. SYNTHESIS OF APPROACHES IN KB TOYS AND ENRON II
There are several fundamental differences between the conclusions
in KB Toys and Enron that will ultimately have important ramifications
for claims traders. 188 First, it’s important to note that Enron II’s
jurisdictional hook is limited to the Southern District of New York, as it
was never appealed to the Second Circuit. 189 However, KB Toys was
appealed to the Third Circuit, which marked the first Court of Appeals
determination on this matter.190
The first disagreement between Enron and KB Toys was whether
disallowance traveled with a claim or claimant.191 In Enron, the Court
found that the statutory construct of § 502(d) articulated that
disallowance was a personal attribute that attached to the claimant,

184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.

In re Metiom, Inc., 301 B.R. 634 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2003).
Id.
Id. at 643 (emphasis added).
Id.
See Milin & Greenberg, supra note 1, at 9.
See id. at 2.
See id.
See id.; In re Enron Corp. (Enron II), 379 B.R. 425, 443 (S.D.N.Y. 2007)
(noting focus of Section 502(d) was the claimant). But see In re KB Toys Inc., 736 F.3d
247, 251-52 (3d Cir. 2013) (explaining that Section 502(d) focused on a category of
claims and not the claimant).
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rather than a claim.192 On the other hand, the court in KB Toys asserted
that § 502(d) intended to apply to a category of claims that would be
disallowed. 193 Thus, under KB Toys a claim could not be washed of
disallowance regardless of who held the claim.194 In Wood & Locker,
unlike KB Toys but like Enron, the Court determined the focus of
Section 502(d) was the claimant and not the claim.195 However, unlike
Enron, the Court in Wood & Locker found the Trustee’s avoiding
powers did not extend to subsequent transferees. 196 It is important to
note that Wood & Locker was decided twenty-five years before KB
Toys, and perhaps the policy issues discussed in KB Toys were not as
prevalent in the late 1980s.197
Second, in Enron the court found the treatment of the disallowance
of claims depended on whether the claims were sold or assigned, 198
while KB Toys did not make this distinction. 199 Under the Enron
approach, disallowance only transfers to the subsequent transferee if the
transfer is made via assignment.200 However, as previously discussed,201
KB Toys’ analysis follows that because attributes of the claim would
travel with the claim and not the claimant, a claim disallowable in the
hands of the original claimant would be disallowed irrespective of who
held the claim.202 Thus, under KB Toys the type of transfer, whether via
sale or assignment, would be of no relevance.203
192.
193.
194.
195.

Enron II, 379 B.R. at 443.
In re KB Toys Inc., 736 F.3d at 251-52.
Id. at 252.
Compare In re Wood & Locker, Inc., 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19501, at *8
(W.D. Tex. June 17, 1988) (explaining that because the focus of Section 502(d) was the
claimant, the power to avoid the claim did not travel with the claim, but rather stayed
with the claimant), with Enron II, 379 B.R. at 439 (holding that disallowance is a
personal disability that does not “inhere in the claim”).
196. Id.
197. See generally Aaron L. Hammer & Michael A. Brandess, Claims Trading: The
Wild West of Chapter 11s, 29 Am. Bankr. Inst. J. 61, 64 (July/August 2010) (noting the
increased complexities of Chapter 11 bankruptcy since 2007).
198. In re KB Toys Inc., 736 F.3d at 252.
199. In re Enron Corp. (Enron II), 379 B.R. 425, 435 (S.D.N.Y. 2007).
200. Id.
201. See discussion supra Part II.A.1.b.
202. KB Toys, 736 F.3d at 251-52.
203. Id. at 254 n.11 (noting “the state law on which [Enron II] relies [on] does not
provide a distinction between assignments and sales”).
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Lastly, in KB Toys the court narrowed its scope to trade claims,204
while the court in Enron sought to expand its reach.205 This seemed to
insinuate the court’s analysis under Enron would be uniform for all
types of claims.206 KB Toys’ restricted scope could also limit its effect on
future claims trading cases.207
B. THE NOT-SO-GOOD GOOD FAITH DEFENSE
Section 550(b) 208 of the Bankruptcy Code provides an important
caveat to the Trustee’s avoiding powers under Section 550(a). 209 As
discussed above, 210 the Section 550(b) good faith defense limits the
Trustee’s avoiding powers when the transfer of property was made
without the transferee’s knowledge of the voidable nature of the
property or in otherwise good faith.211
The subsequent transferees in both Enron and KB Toys attempted to
assert a good faith defense.212 The courts looked to the clear language of
the statute, which protects a good faith transferee who purchases
property of the estate that is avoidable by the Trustee.213 As discussed in
Part I.B(c)(ii), because the good faith defense applies to purchases of
property of the estate and not claims, this defense was inapplicable.214

204.
205.

Id. at 251.
In re Enron Corp. (Enron II), 379 B.R. 425, 428 n.5 (S.D.N.Y. 2007 (“[N]o
legal and policy basis supports the premise that transferees of bonds or notes should be
treated differently than those holding the transferred loan claims.”).
206. Id. (noting “All the post-petition transferees assume the risk” of subordination
and disallowance).
207. See Milin & Greenberg, supra note 1, at 9 (“[KB Toys’] decision’s full
implications remain to be determined[.]”).
208. 11 U.S.C. § 550(b) (2012).
209. Id. § 550(a).
210. See discussion supra Part I.B.3.b.
211. Id.
212. In re KB Toys Inc., 736 F.3d 247, 254-55 (3d Cir. 2013); In re Enron Corp.
(Enron I), 340 B.R. 180, 184 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2006), vacated and remanded, 379 B.R.
425 (S.D.N.Y. 2007).
213. 11 U.S.C. § 550(b); KB Toys, 736 F.3d at 255.
214. KB Toys, 736 F.3d at 255.
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C. EFFECTS OF KB TOYS AND ENRON
1. Case Study of Lehman Brothers
On September 15, 2008, the world changed as the fourth-largest
bank on Wall Street at the time filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy
protection.215 The Lehman Brothers Bankruptcy was approximately six
times larger than any United States Bankruptcy 216 and involved
hundreds of thousands of creditors worldwide.217 While it is no secret
the Lehman Bankruptcy triggered a global financial crisis,218 it seems
almost counterintuitive that within the folds of disaster, there existed a
multi-billion dollar market for claims trading.219
As of March 2014, Lehman Brothers distributed approximately
$80.4 billion to its creditors since it emerged from bankruptcy. 220
Creditors obtained approximately 26.9 cents on the dollar on their
claims. 221 Approximately two-thirds of Lehman’s $80.4 billion
distributions, or approximately $53.6 billion, went to third-party
creditors.222
Although the bankruptcy process has streamlined over the years, it
took almost four years for the company to emerge from bankruptcy.223
Creditors who did not want to stick around to see through their claims

215. Jonathan Stempel, Lehman Payout Tops $80 Billion, Creditors Get Another
$17.9 Billion, REUTERS (Mar. 27, 2014), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/03/27/uslehman-bankruptcy-idUSBREA2Q1DD20140327.
216. Id.
217. Voluntary Petition for Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc., In re Lehman Brothers
Holdings Inc. et al., No. 08-13555 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2008), ECF No. 1; Christopher
Scinta & Linda Sandler, Lehman Facing More Than 16,000 Creditors’ Claims,
Bloomberg (Update 1), BLOOMBERG (September 23, 2009), http://www.bloomberg.com
/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aR9y3xb3PdNw.
218. Scinta & Sandler, supra note 217.
219. Kelly Bit & Lisa Abromowicz, Hedge Funds Get Fat on Lehman’s Remains,
BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (May 22, 2014), http://www.businessweek.com/printer/
articles/202584-hedge-funds-get-fat-on-lehmans-remains.
220. Stempel, supra note 215.
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. Id. (noting Lehman Brothers filed petitions for Chapter 11 bankruptcy
protection on September 15, 2008 and the plan for reorganization became effective on
March 12, 2012).
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sold early on and distressed-investing hedge funds were eager to
purchase those claims.224 For example, Paulson & Co. invested over $4
billion in claims and has already profited over $1 billion after initial
distributions.225
Companies like Paulson & Co. did not blindly invest billions of
dollars. 226 After reviewing Lehman’s corporate documents to identify
valuable assets that could be purchased at a discount, Paulson invested
in the claims trading market. 227 However, even with their extensive
research, they risked billions of dollars on claims that had the potential
of being avoided by the Trustee.228 Furthermore, some indemnification
clauses with the original claimants didn’t protect investors from
investments in claims that could be avoided by the Trustee.229
2. Less Benefits for Claim Traders
Now that courts are beginning to establish the disallowance of
claims in the hands of subsequent transferees, the benefits of claim
trading tend to be less clear.230 Original claimants, who want to sell their
claims and separate themselves from the time and cost of a lengthy
bankruptcy proceeding, still run the risk of being pulled back into the
process.231 Additionally, this involvement leads to litigation costs that
were unseen at early stage of claims trading.232
As demonstrated by the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy, the claims
distribution process of billions of dollars in claims can take years.233
Investors like Paulson & Co. who risk billions of dollars in transferred
claims may think twice about investing billions in claims that could

224.
225.

Bit & Abromowicz, supra note 219.
Joseph Checkler & Patrick Fitzgerald, Lehman to Dole Out Additional $17.9
Billion to Creditors, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 27, 2014), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/
SB10001424052702304688104579465170602706210.
226. Id.
227. Id. It is important to note that in KB Toys, the statement of financial affairs
filed at the onset of the case indicated the KB Toys Original Claimants had received
preferential transfers. In re KB Toys Inc., 736 F.3d 247, 250 (3d Cir. 2013).
228. Checkler & Fitzgerald, supra note 225.
229. Id.
230. Oellerman & Douglas, supra note 65, at 6-7.
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. Smith & Paget, supra note 165, at 32.
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eventually be disallowed.234 Some investors may walk the line because
the law is still unclear, while others may back off at the prospect of a
surefire way to lose billions of dollars.235
If Paulson & Co. had invested in Lehman’s claim trading market
Post-KB Toys in the Delaware Bankruptcy Court, it is less likely they
would have invested $4 billion.236 Investors are more likely to be wary
of investing in trade claims under a KB Toys jurisdiction rather than the
Enron court’s approach. 237 Under Enron’s current approach investors
like Paulson & Co. could skirt around the rule by transferring claims
through a sale, rather than assignment. 238 However, claims trading of
non-trade claims are likely to fare worse under an Enron jurisdiction
because the court did not narrow its analysis to a specific type of
claim.239 Luckily for Paulson & Co., Lehman Brother’s bankruptcy was
filed in the same jurisdiction as Enron, the Southern District of New
York.240
3. Sale/Assignment Distinction in Future Transfer Agreements
Enron’s disparate treatment between claims sold and claims
transferred via assignment generated confusion for all parties involved,
including courts. 241 While the court defined assignment, 242 it didn’t
particularly define what a sale was but rather harped on what it wasn’t—
234.
235.

Checkler & Fitzgerald, supra note 225.
See Milin & Greenberg, supra note 1, at 1 (“Billions of dollars, and perhaps
trillions, are potentially at stake—both for claims traders and for bankruptcy estates that
may be denied this important remedy.”).
236. See Benzija, supra note 2, at 82 (“The pervasiveness of claims-trading
guarantees that in jurisdictions where the Enron II holding is accepted, claims traders
will be incentivized to acquire such claims.”).
237. See id.
238. Id. at 15.
239. In re KB Toys Inc., 736 F.3d 247, 254, n.11(3d Cir. 2013).
240. Notice of Effective Date and Distribution Date at 1, In re Lehman Brothers
Holdings Inc., et al., 445 B.R. 143, Case No. 08-13555 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2011), ECF
No. 26039.
241. In re KB Toys Inc., 470 B.R. 331, 340 (Bankr. Del. 2012) (“The terms
‘assignment’ and ‘sale’ are not easily distinguishable.”).
242. In re Enron Corp., 379 B.R. 425, 435 (Enron II) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2007), Adv.
No. 05–01025 (S.D.N.Y 2007) (“An assignment is a contractual transfer of a right,
interest, or claim from one person to another.”).
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an assignment. 243 While this may be troubling to most, it is also an
opportunity for investors and transferors to take advantage of the
caveat.244 However, it is likely courts will catch up and this technical
runaround and the sale/assignment distinction will be litigated in the
future.245
As clearly demonstrated by Longacre, the dichotomy between sale
and assignment created by Enron II 246 does not exist in real-life
practice. 247 In many cases sale contracts “speak of the seller ‘selling
transferring and assigning’ the assets at issue.’” 248 While Enron
delineated the different legal effects of a sale and assignment, the court
gave little guidance on how to determine whether a transfer agreement is
a sale or assignment.249
Additionally, this dichotomy seems to imply the sale/assignment
distinction is a technicality that can be overcome by a carefully drafted
transfer agreement. 250 Transferee’s will be careful to create transfer
agreements that attempt to indicate the claim was transferred via a sale,
rather than an assignment.251
D. SOLUTION TO THE CLAIMS TRADING DILEMMA: TWO PRONG
APPROACH
While there is no neatly packaged solution to the claims trading
dilemma caused by KB Toys and Enron, there are ways to calm the

243.
244.

Id. at 435-36 (“Assignment law principles do not apply to sales.”).
See BUY-SIDE BRIEFS, supra note 164 (noting the caveat in Enron encourages
traders to carefully analyze their transfer documents to ensure they clearly indicate
whether the transfer document is a sale or assignment).
245. See id. (“Enron II creates a dichotomy that does not exist in real world practice
(where many sale contracts speak of the seller “selling, transferring and assigning” the
assets at issue). Courts have obviously struggled to translate that dichotomy into real
analysis. KB Toys suggests a way out of the legal morass created by Enron II, but it is a
result that could upset settled market expectations if read broadly. Clearly these issues
will require further elaboration by courts.”).
246. Enron II, 379 B.R. at 435.
247. BUY-SIDE BRIEFS, supra note 164.
248. Id.
249. See id.
250. See id.
251. See id.

526

FORDHAM JOURNAL
OF CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW

[Vol. XX

anxiety of claim traders.252 In this two-prong approach, the first prong
calls for claims traders to heavily negotiate, repurchase provisions and
recourse actions, as to limit the damning effect if the Trustee avoids the
claim.253 The second prong calls for the creditor’s committee to play a
more active role in facilitating the claims trading market.254
1. Prong 1: Heavily Negotiated Repurchase Provisions and Recourse
Actions
Most claim-purchase and assignment agreements include a
repurchase agreement. 255 Claimants hesitate to agree to such clauses
because it keeps them tethered to the bankruptcy case, essentially
nulling their purpose for selling the claim in the first place. 256 Thus,
these agreements are heavily negotiated prior to a transfer.257
Repurchase provisions and recourse actions provide for
reimbursement in the event a claim is reduced, subordinated or even
disallowed.258 In particular, repurchase agreements require the original
claimant to buy back all or some part of the claim.259 Some provisions of
repurchase agreements and recourse actions automatically kick in when
a claims objection is filed while others kick in after the claim is
litigated.260 In addition to repayment of the claim, these provisions call
for the transferor to pay interest from the date of the claim sale through
252. See id. (“Until courts give further guidance on what specifically creates an
“assignment” versus a “sale,” parties to claim transfer agreements should seek legal
advice on whether their documents need to be updated and refined.”).
253. See Smith & Paget, supra note 165, at 32.
254. Hammer & Brandess, supra note 197, at 64.
255. Smith & Paget, supra note 165, at 32 (noting repurchase provisions are
commonly included in claim-purchase agreements when parties agree to recourse
actions).
256. Id. (“[A] repurchase obligation may convert a sale of a bankruptcy claim from
a measure to reduce risk and ongoing costs to a means of significant financial
exposure.”).
257. Id. (noting the benefits of repurchase provisions for purchasers but highlighting
the risks for sellers if repurchase provisions kick in and require the seller to pay back
more than the amount for which they sold the claim).
258. Id. (“Typically, an order of the bankruptcy court reducing, disallowing or
subordinating the claim will trigger a repurchase provision.”).
259. Id.
260. Id.
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the date that the repurchase provision was triggered to cover the cost of
capital, at a rate sometimes as high as ten percent per annum.261
In the wake of Enron, KB Toys and Longacre, claimants in cases
pending in the Southern District of New York and Third Circuit should
pay close attention to the repurchase clauses in their transfer
agreements.262 While transferee’s should seek to reduce their exposure,
even original claimants should be concerned with doing their due
diligence prior to selling or assigning their claims.263 In Longacre, the
original claimholder would have faced paying over $500,000 in excess
of what they sold the claim for if Delphi had not withdrawn its
objection. 264 Even when Delphi withdrew the claims objection, the
transferee requested $817,000 in interest from the transferor. 265 The
transferor could have hedged that risk by putting different terms in their
repurchase provisions and characterizing their transfer as an
assignment.266

261.
262.
263.
264.
265.

Id.
Oellerman & Douglas, supra note 65, at 5-6.
Smith & Paget, supra note 165, at 32.
Id. at 33.
Longacre Master Fund, Ltd. v. ATS Automation Tooling Sys. Inc. (Longacre
I), 456 B.R. 633, 639 (S.D.N.Y. 2011), vacated in part, 496 F. App’x 135 (2d Cir.
2012) (noting the $817,000 excess was calculated as the 10% interest from the date of
the Assignment agreement, December 14, 2011, until the allowance of the Claim on
March 30, 2011.).
266. Smith & Paget, supra note 165, at 33 (showing it was irrefutable that the
transfer was a sale. “As a sale, ATS’s representations regarding knowledge of a
preference action would be irrelevant because any resulting obligation would be a
personal disability retained by ATS.”).
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2. Prong 2: Using the Creditor’s Committee to Encourage Claims
Trading
Section 1102(a) of the Bankruptcy Code charges the United States
Trustee with the duty to organize and appoint a committee of creditors
with unsecured claims in Chapter 11 cases.267 The creditor’s committee
(the “Committee”) is instrumental in investigating the financial state of
the debtor, proposing a plan and, most importantly, the administration of
the claimant’s unsecured claims. 268 The Committee is invaluable in
complex reorganizations, which as discussed in this note are venues for
heavy claims trading.269
The heart of the Committee’s role in administering the claims
reconciliation process is maximizing the amount each creditor is paid on
their claim. 270 The value of a claim in the claims trading market
increases with the likelihood of full payment on the claim.271 Creditors’
Committees serve their constituents by either working to approve a plan
that provides for high payoffs or helping claim holders find “immediate
exit opportunities.” 272 Thus, arguably an efficient claims trading market
is part of the Committee’s duties.273
The wrinkle in claims trading created by KB Toys and Enron
makes the Committee’s job that much tougher.274 Nonetheless, there are
ways a Committee can iron out some of the issues presented to all

267.
268.

11 U.S.C. § 1102(a) (2012).
Information for Prospective Creditor Committee Members on Chapter 11
Cases, 1 DEP’T OF JUSTICE 2, http://www.justice.gov/ust/eo/private_trustee/
library/chapter11/docs/credcom.pdf.
269. See Milin & Greenberg, supra note 1, at 1.
270. Adam J. Levitin, Bankruptcy Markets: Making Sense of Claims Trading, 4
BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 67, 111 (Fall 2009).
271. See BUY-SIDE BRIEFS, supra note 164 (“Parties’ assessment of repayment risk
is typically reflected in the negotiated price of a traded claim.”).
272. See generally Levitin, supra note 270, at 111 (“If creditors’ committees are
responsible for maximizing the return for their constituents as they exist at any
particular time, that could be accomplished either through working for a better plan or
by providing their constituents with improved immediate exit opportunities.“).
273. See id. at 111 (noting creditors committees are responsible for maximizing
return for constituents).
274. See generally id. at 111-12 (explaining that “claims trading could derail plan
confirmation and add delay, which might drive down the price of claims for remaining
constituents”).
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players in the claims trading market.275 Encouraging Committees to play
a more active role in the claims trading market can counter and even
reduce the complications associated with claims trading and potential
avoidance actions. 276 Most broadly, the Committee can be used as a
platform to encourage creditors to engage in the claims trading
market.277 The more confident a transferee is in the Committee’s ability
to maximize payment on a claim, the more likely the transferee will pay
handsomely for purchase claims.278
One of the many ways Committee’s can facilitate claims trading is
“informing claimholders of the possibilities of claim purchases” and
posting available claim trade prices. 279 Providing claim traders with
information about previous claim purchases can assist transferors in
evaluating the value of their claim.280 This posting process may also help
match claim sellers with purchasers, as certain transferees listed in the
posting may be looking to purchase more claims.281
Creditors can also assist the claims trading process by posting about
issues in the market.282 From 1983 to 1991, Rule 3001(e) “required not
only that parties transferring claims inform the court that a transfer of
claims was taking place, but also that they disclose the consideration
paid for the transferred claims.”283 The challenges to claims trading at
that time centered around the availability and access of adequate
information to enable transferees and transferors to make an informed
decision on the claim.284 Additionally, Courts utilized this information
275. See generally id. at 111 (explaining the importance of the creditors committee
in light of the benefits and drawbacks of claims trading).
276. See id. at 110-11 (“Creditors’ committees may not be the ideal mechanism for
improving market efficiency by enabling claims sellers to comparison shop among
buyers’ offers, but they represent the most easily achievable step in that direction.”).
277. Hammer & Brandess, supra note 197, at 64.
278. See Levitin, supra note 270, at 111.
279. Id.
280. Id. at 110-11.
281. Id. at 111-12 (noting that the “Dana [Corporation’s] Official Unsecured
Creditors’ Committee listed the contact information of claims purchasers on its website
to help the creditors it represented obtain maximum value for their claims”).
282. Id. at 111.
283. Michael H. Whitaker, Regulating Claims Trading in Chapter 11 Bankruptcies:
A Proposal for Mandatory Disclosure, 3 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 303, 317 (1994).
284. W. Andrew P. Logan III, Claims Trading: The Need for Further Amending
Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 3001(e)(2), 2 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 495,
496 (1994).
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when approving claim transfers.285 The amendment to Rule 3001(e) in
1991, eliminating disclosure requirements in claims trading has
inevitably led to less protection for unsophisticated creditors.286 While
mandatory disclosures come with their own set of problems, disclosure
of ongoing claims trading in a case by the Creditor’s Committee will
inevitably lead to increased transparency regarding the value and
disabilities of claims. 287 However, “[while] increased disclosure
mandates would provide greater protections for unsophisticated
creditors attempting to sell their claims, such regulations would detract
from many of the profitable opportunities currently enjoyed.”288
CONCLUSION
The future of claims trading remains to be seen following the
decisions in Enron and KB Toys. It is still unclear whether a claim that
has been disallowed in the hands of the original claimants should be
disallowed in the hand of a subsequent transferee.289 Enron jurisdictions
will continue to differentiate these claims based on whether the claim
was transferred through a purchase-sale agreement or via assignment.290
Even if courts clarify Enron’s confusing sale/assignment distinction, the
fact remains that under Enron the disallowance of a claim is a personal
attribute of the claimant that travels with the claimant.291 In contrast, the
KB Toys approach finds a disallowable claim in the hands of an original
claimant is equally disallowable in the hands of a subsequent transferee
because the disability follows the claim.292
Developing a solution and providing increased clarity in the fate of
claims trading is important, as claims’ trading is a multi-billion dollar

285. Whitaker, supra note 283, at 319 (“Courts could disapprove a transfer in
situations where, for example, the amount paid for claims was significantly lower than
that provided in the reorganization plan.”).
286. Hammer & Brandess, supra note 197, at 63.
287. See Levitin, supra note 270, at 111 (noting disclosure of contact information
for claim traders will assist creditors with obtaining the maximum value for their
claims).
288. Hammer & Brandess, supra note 197, at 64.
289. See Milin & Greenberg, supra note 1, at 1.
290. BUY-SIDE BRIEFS, supra note 164.
291. In re Enron Corp. (Enron II), 379 B.R. 425, 443 (S.D.N.Y. 2007).
292. In re KB Toys Inc., 736 F.3d 247, 249 (3d Cir. 2013).
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market, which creates liquidity in the marketplace.293 In the meantime,
investors and creditors who seek to participate in the claims trading
process should follow the two-pronged approach. Heavily negotiated
indemnification agreements and recourse actions coupled with the
Creditors Committee’s facilitation of the claims trading process will
mitigate some of the risk of claims trading.294

293.
294.

See Weisfelner, supra note 26, at 1-2, 7.
BUY-SIDE BRIEFS, supra note 164.

